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FAMILY ATTRIBUTION
INTRODUCTION
The concept of attribution (constructive ownership) is one of the most difficult
concepts to understand and correctly apply in tax law today. Attribution is the
imposition of stock ownership upon an individual or entity from another individual
or entity for taxation purposes.' This concept is further complicated when the
already attributed stock is reattributed to a third individual or entity.
Attribution is premised upon control.2 It is similar to the incidents of
ownership doctrine found throughout the estate and gift tax code.3 Under this
doctrine an insured party is presumed to have control over an insurance policy when
he or his estate has a right to the economic benefits of the policy.4 But if there are
no incidents of ownership under Code Section 2042, the policy will not be included
in the estate of the deceased taxpayer.5 The Code advances the idea of control one
step further because attribution is based solely on a relationship between a taxpayer
and his family or some other affiliated entity.6 For example, the Service will assume
that a taxpayer has control over stock rights much like the SEC assumes (under Rule
16(b) of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act) that all individuals who purchase and sell
stock in which they have a ten percent interest do so with insider information.7
Control is also used in the attribution rules in the consideration of options.'
The holder of an option to own stock is considered as actually owning the stock.
Therefore, this stock can be attributed to other individuals or entities.9 One
explanation of this concept is that the option to purchase the shares (which the tax-
payermay obtain if the option is exercised) must be set aside until the taxpayer either
exercises the option or allows the option to lapse. The concept of control will be
discussed further in the waiver of attribution section.
TYPES OF ATTRIBUTION
There are four attribution categories: family, corporate, partnership and estate
& trust. There is little uniformity between the various forms.'0 Furthermore, each
B. BITrKER & J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS § 9.21 (1979).
Id. Attribution is based upon whom is deemed to have control over the stock rather than mere ownership.
Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(c) (2) (1986).
Id. This includes the power to change beneficiaries, to surrender, cancel or assign the policy, to revoke an
assignment or to use the policy as collateral for loans.
I Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(c)(i) (1986). Example: Decedent irrevocably assigned an insurance policy to his
spouse, four years before his death, retaining no reversionary interest in the policy. The policy is not
includible in decedent's estate.
6 B. BITrTKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 1.
SEC Act §16(b) (1934).
I.R.C. § 318(a) (4) (1986).
9 1d.
l0 B. BITrKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 1.
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form has several different rules. ' So when considering attribution and its complex-
ity taxpayers are dealing with a scheme of rules for which there is no continuity or
consistency.
Although each type of attribution has its own exclusive rules there are some
concepts that are universal to all of the attribution code sections. These concepts are
not found in the Code, but are generally accepted and used throughout academia to
describe the different types of attribution."
The first type is known as chain attribution (double attribution or reattribution)
and it causes the greatest confusion in its application. 3 As the various names
suggest, there are two stages to this transfer. First, stock is attributed from an entity
to its owners or beneficiaries. 4 Secondly, the attributed stock is then attributed from
its owners or beneficiaries to members of their families. (The transfer can also begin
with the family members and conclude with the entity.) 5 An example would be
Father, F, has a 25% interest in partnership X. Daughter, D, also has a 25% interest
in partnership X. The partnership owns the remaining 50 outstanding shares. Indi-
vidually both F and D are considered to own 37.5% of the partnership's stock.' 6 But
since F and D are related under Section 318(a)(1), they are considered as owning
each other's interests. So in the end what started out as a 25% interest has been
transformed by attribution into a 75% interest for both F and D. 17 The attribution of
stock from an entity to its owners or beneficiaries (step one) is known as direct
attribution and its reverse is known as back attribution." An example of Direct
Attribution: A, an individual, has a 50% interest in a partnership. The partnership
owns 50 of the 100 outstanding shares. A is considered as owning 75 shares.' 9 An
example of Back Attribution: Using the same facts as above, the partnership would
be considered as owning all the stock. 20
Finally, when stock is attributed from one family member to another the
transaction is referred to as collateral attribution. 2' An example would be an
individual, H, his wife, W, his son, S, and grandson, G, own the 100 outstanding
shares of the stock of a corporation (each own 25 shares). H, W and S are each
considered as owning 100 shares while G is considered as owning 50 shares (his own
'id.
12 I.R.C. § 7701 (1986). This is a definitional section of the Code.
'1 B. BI'TrKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 1.
14 Id.
15 Id.
"I.R.C. § 318(a)(2)(A) (1986). Both F and Dare considered to own 25% of the partnership's 50% interest
(12.5%). Therefore, 25% plus 12.5% equals 37.5%.
'I I.R.C. § 318(a)(l)(A)(ii) (1986).
S B. BIrrKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 1.
"Treas. Reg. § 1.318-2(c) (Example 1) (1986). 50 shares plus 50% of the partnership's 50 shares (25 shares)
equals 75 shares.
20 Id. The partnership is considered as owning all of A's 50 shares.
21 B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 1.
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and his father's).22 This is the topic of this article.
When considering whom should be included in the family for tax purposes
there are three primary groups that the family can be divided into. First, the nuclear
family which includes the members of a household. In most cases this would include
the taxpayer, his spouse and children. Second, the lineal descendants and ancestors
of the taxpayer which includes the members of the extended family. In other words,
all the people in a direct line to and from the taxpayer excluding those who make up
the taxpayer's nuclear family. The third group are the individuals who are related
by affinity, the in-laws and spouses of lineal descendants. The Code, as it stands
today, includes all these groups in its attribution rules, although there is no
uniformity in their application.2 3
There are thirty-four code sections that either define or apply family attribu-
tion rules. Among these thirty-four Code sections, there are nine different rules as
to whom is to be included and many times these rules are not very different.24 For
example, Code Sections 267, 544, 341(d), 341(e), 4975 and Treasury Regulation
1.341-4 all have the same four groups making up the core of whom is included within
the family for attribution purposes. 25 The only difference between these family
groups is the addition to the core of each group.26 In each of the first three, one family
group is added and in the fourth, all family groups are used.27
The Code has divided the family into seventeen separate groups. 28 Each of
these seventeen groups is not a code section or a rule in its own right, but instead it
is merely one cog in a large and complex scheme. What makes the Code complex
is that these seventeen groups have been arranged into nine different sets. 29 These
nine sets are the attribution rules.
The attribution rules are both general and specific. The most specific rules are
found in Section 672(c) which sets out whom is included in the family for purposes
of Code Section 671.30 Section 672 only includes the grantor's spouse, (conditioned
on whether the spouse is living with the grantor), parents, children and siblings.3
Rule 4975 is the most general attribution rule. It covers the taxpayer's spouse,
ancestors, lineal descendents and the spouses of the taxpayer's lineal descendants.
It would not be as bad if the complexity stopped with the nine definitions set
22 Treas. Reg. § 1.318-2 (1986).
23 See Appendix A.
24 ld.
2 See Appendix B.
2 6 Id.
27 Id.
2 See Appendix A.
2 9 
Id.
30 I.R.C. § 672(c) (1986). See Appendix A.
31 Id.
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out where the taxpayer could find them, but this is not the case. The rules are
scattered throughout the Code.32 The first attribution rule appears in Section 267 and
the last one in Section 4975.13 Another flaw in the Code is how a rule is explained
to the reader. Some rules, such as the rule found in Code Section 318, are contained
solely in one code section. But there are other rules, such as the rule in Section 341 (e)
which refers the taxpayer to the rule in Code Section 267.34 So, in order to understand
rule 341(e), one must understand the rule in 267(c). Finally there is the needless
repetition of the same attribution rule under another code section. Such is the case
with Code Sections 267(c)(4) and 544(a)(2). 35 By placing the same rule under two
different sections the taxpayer may think that they are different rules. The Service
further reinforces this idea by having other rules use both Sections 267 and 544 as
their family attribution rule. 36 This situation can be illustrated by Code Section 341.
Code Section 341(e) uses Section 267 as its family attribution rule and Section
341 (d) uses Section 544 as its family attribution rule.37 The family members which
make up Sections 267 and 544 are the same.38 Why, then, does the Service further
complicate the attribution rules by creating complexity in the reader's psyche.
Although the Code's treatment of family attribution is obviously inadequate
there are some good aspects to the Code's treatment of family attribution. For
instance, whendealing with lineals and ancestors the Service, when it wanted to be
specific, singled out the individuals that were to be included in the family and when
a general attribution rule would suffice the Service would use that.39 But, one
problem with the use of the general terms of "ancestors" and" lineal descendants"
is that these terms cover six or seven individual groups4° and places them into two
categories. This can be simplified by using a single term, "vertical attribution". By
creating fewer categories complexity is diminished and the Code becomes less
confusing.
Another advantage is that the rules as they stand are created from seventeen
sectors which are mixed and matched. 4' By using a base of three defined terms which
is under a single code section the taxpayer will have a better understanding of the rule
while the legislature retains maximum flexibility to determine the breadth of the rule.
Yet another advantage is the elimination of the problem of the same rule having two
names. This is accomplished because instead of the basis of the rules located within
each attribution code section they are now laid out in a single section and then applied
to the various attribution code sections. Thereby eliminating the illusory dicotomy
32 I.R.C. § 4975 (1986). See Appendix A.
3 3 
Id.
" I.R.C. § 341(e) (1986).
15 I.R.C. § 267(c)(4), § 43 1(d) (1986).
36 1.R.C. § 43 1(e), § 43 1(d) (1986).
3 7 ld.
31 See Appendix A.
39 Id.
o There is an issue in the Code as to whether minor children are a part of the definition of children.
41 See Appendix A.
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that now exists in the Code.
WAIVER OF ATTRIBUTION
These attribution rules are subject to the concept of attribution avoidance. The
first type of avoidance is a complete waiver such as is provided for in Code Sections
302 and 306. Both sections require a complete disposition of the stock interest by
the taxpayer-shareholder. Under Section 306, the disposition cannot be to anyone
who is covered by Section 318(a) (1).42 Under Section 302, the taxpayer-share-
holder, besides giving up his interest (other than a credit interest), cannot acquire the
same stock from the same corporation for a ten year period; beginning on the date
of the disposition. In the event such stock is acquired by means other than by bequest
or inheritance he must notify the corporation's secretary.
The second type of waiver is a partial waiver. Attribution "attribute[s] unity
to a family and such assumptions may, indeed, prove awkward or unfair in cases
where families do not behave as the rules assume they will, and intra-family disputes
exist as to who should control and how." 4 3 There are often times when "intra-
family" disputes result in changes of stock ownership and control. When these cases
are brought before the courts for determination the results are not consistent."
The idea of partial attribution as a result of intra-family disputes or bad blood
is a fairly new topic. Prior to United States v. Davis,45 the Supreme Court had not
considered the role of attribution regarding Section 302(b)(1). In Davis the taxpayer
and a second individual organized a corporation, with each receiving 500 shares of
stock.46 The taxpayer split his 500 shares with his wife.4 7 Shortly thereafter the
taxpayer purchased 1,000 shares of preferred stock.4 8 The purpose of this transaction
was to increase the corporation's working capital so it could qualify for a loan
through the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC).49 The stock would be re-
deemed when the RFC loan had been repaid.50 During the period of the loan the
taxpayer purchased the other 500 shares from the second individual and split these
shares between his children.5 ' Once the RFC loan was repaid the corporation
redeemed the taxpayer's preferred stock.5 2 The taxpayer corlsidered the redemption
as a sale to the company qualifying for capital gain treatment under Section 302.11
42 This includes the taxpayer-shareholder's spouse, children, grandchildren, and parents.
4 Title Insurance and Trust Co. v. United States, 484 F.2d 462, 465 n.4 (9th Cir. 1973).
4See Metzger Trust v. Commissioner, 693 F.2d 459 (5th Cir. 1982), cf.Haft Trust v. Commissioner, 510 F.2d
43 (1st Cir. 1975).
45 397 U.S. 301 (1970).
4Id.
47 Id. at 302.
48 Id.
49 Id. at 302-03.
50 Id.
511 d. at 303.
52 Id.
53 Id.
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The Service disagreed stating that the redemption of the taxpayer's stock was
essentially equivalent to a dividend and therefore treated as ordinary income under
Sections 301 and 316 of the Code.54 The issue before the Supreme Court was whether
there was a legitimate business motivation for the loan qualifying the distribution
under Section 302(b)(1) of the Code. 5" The court, after reviewing the legislative
history, the Code and its corresponding regulations, determined that the attribution
rules applied to Section 302(b)(1) (unless eliminated under Code Sections 302(b)(2)
and (3)) in determining whether a distribution is "not essentially equivalent to a
dividend" and the taxpayer must be deemed the owner of all 1,000 shares of the
company's stock. 56
Davis is often cited in cases in which the bad blood issue is litigated.57 It is a
dividing line creating disagreement among the circuits as to the role of bad blood in
Section 302. The First Circuit does not follow Davis and permits a bad blood
exception to the absolute Davis rule.58 The Fifth Circuit follows Davis.59 Finally,
the Internal Revenue Service has also taken a stand on the issue. 60 The Service, sided
with the Fifth Circuit concluding that the bad blood argument "is inconsistent with
both the legislative history of Section 318 and the language and the rationale of
Davis." 61 In an earlier ruling, the Service indicated the factors to be considered in
determining whether a reduction in a shareholder's proportional interest is a
meaningful reduction within the meaning of Davis.62 The factors to be considered
are "(1) the right to vote and thereby exercise control; (2) the right to participate in
current earnings and accumulated surplus; and (3) the right to share in net assets on
liquidation."' 63  The Service also said that the "facts and circumstances of a
particular case cannot contradict the mechanical determination under Section 318 of
how much stock a shareholder owns.' 'I Also, authorities on the subject say that "the
Davis decision weakens, but does not eliminate, the family fight argument in
mitigation of Section 318 attribution under Section 302 (b)(1)." 65
As previously stated, the Fifth Circuit and its followers base their argument on
two major points, the Supreme Court decision in Davis and a strict reading of the
legislative history. In Cerone v. Commissioner,66 the taxpayer and his son were each
fifty percent shareholders in a corporation. Because of hostility between taxpayer
54 Id.
55 Id. at 304.
56 Id. at 307.
" See Metzger Trust v. Commissioner, 693 F.2d 459, 464-66 (5th Cir. 1982), Cerone v. Commissioner, 87
T.C. 1, 18-28 (1986). cf.Haft Trust v. Commissioner, 510 F.2d 43, 47-8 (lst Cir., 1975).
" Haft, 510 F.2d at 47.
19 Metzger, 693 F.2d at 465.
11 Rev. Rul. 75-502, 1975-2 C.B. 111, Rev. Rul. 80-26, 1980-1 C.B. 66.
61 Rev. Rul. 80-26, 1980-1 C.B. 66, 67.
62 Rev. Rul. 75-502, 1975-2 C.B. 111, 112.
63 Id.
I Rev. Rul. 80-26 at 67.
65 B. BInrKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 1, § 9.24.
- 87 T.C. 1 (1986).
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and his son, the corporation redeemed all of taxpayer's stock therein. 67 The Cerone
court held that "family hostility does not nullify the family attribution rules of sec.
318(a)(1)." 68 The redemption was treated essentially as a dividend within the
meaning of Section 302(b)(1). 69 Besides Davis, the Cerone court analyzed the
legislative history of Section 302 to add support for their strict, no exceptions stance
on the bad blood issue citing H.R. No. 1337, "before the enactment of the 1954 Code
the attribution rules were sometimes applied and sometimes not applied; to avoid
that uncertainty, Section 302 expressly made the attribution rules applicable for
purposes of determining whether a distribution in redemption should be treated as
a dividend." 70
In Metzger Trust v. Commissioner,71 the David Metzger Trust (taxpayer) was
created by David Metzger to benefit his wife and children and his eldest son was
named trustee. Later the family business was incorporated and the trust became a
shareholder thereof.72 On Metzger's death the eldest son assumed control of the
business in which the daughters were directors. 73 A quarrel began between the eldest
son and the daughters which intensified until there was open animosity between the
parties.7 4 Soon the bitterness reached the point where neither party could tolerate the
other and they agreed to terminate their joint ownership of the corporation. 75
Following lengthy negotiations all agreed as to how the stock was to be redeemed,
including the Metzger Trust, since the daughters each had a one third interest.7 6 The
Trust argued that "family discord may 'mitigate' the application of the attribution
rules in determining dividend equivalency, especially given the undisputed fact that
the purpose of the redemption was not to distribute corporate earnings." 77 The
Metzger court rebuts the Trust's argument by stating the hard and fast rule in Davis,
that the attribution rules must apply before determining dividend equivalency." 78 It
went on to quote the Senate Report stating, "the rules for constructive ownership of
stock Section 318(a) for purposes of this section shall apply generally.' 79 Metzger
is an important case because it sets out the Fifth Circuit's position on this issue,
although the court was not in total agreement.80 Other cases have relied upon the
legislative history of Section 302 to ensure the blanket treatment of Section 318 on
67 ld.
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 ld. at 19.
71 693 F.2d 459 (51h Cir. 1982).
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 Id.
11 Id. at 460-61.
76 ld.
77 Id. at 463.
71 Id. at 464.
79 S. REP. No. 1622,83rd Cong., 2d sess. 44 (1954), reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODECONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4621,
4872.
10 Metzger Trust v. Commissioner, 693 F.2d 459 (5th Cir., 1982) (Tannenwald J., dissenting).
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Section 302.81 Although the Fifth Circuit will not allow a partial waiver of the
Section 318 attribution rules in a Section 302(b)(1) situation, the court did allow bad
blood as a factor but at a much later stage of the process. "First, the attribution rules
are plainly and straight forwardly applied. Second, a determination is made whether
there has been a reduction in the stockholder's proportional interest in the corpora-
tion. If not, the inquiry ends because, if there is no change in the stockholder's
interest, dividend equivalency results. If there had been a reduction, then all the facts
and circumstances must be examined to see if the reduction was meaningful under
United States v. Davis. It is at this point and only then, that family hostility becomes
an appropriate factor for consideration." 82 This is the only way in which the Fifth
Circuit will give family hostility any credence.
On the other side of the issue is the First Circuit. In their leading case of Haft
Trust v. Commissioner,83 Haft was married and had four children (two from this
marriage and two from his wife's past marriage). Haft's father-in-law loaned money
to the Haft-Gaines Co. in which Haft was both an officer and a stockholder, and
purchased 100,000 shares of the corporation's common stock.84 He later created four
identical taxpayer trusts and transferred 25,000 shares to each without considera-
tion.85 Haft was later divorced, but during the proceeding each party made serious
and bitter charges and counter charges against the other.86 At the time that the
proceedings were initiated Haft moved out from the family residence and had no
contact with the children for six or seven months.87 Sometime after the divorce Mrs.
Haft remarried and moved to a new residence taking the children with her.88 After
the divorce was final Haft was indifferent towards the children.89 He did not see them
at all from the time of the divorce (1967) till 1971.90
The father-in-law terminated the trusts at the time of the divorce proceed-
ings. 9 ' There were also negotiations respecting the termination of the stock interests
which were later redeemed.92 The issue in Haft, is whether the existence of family
hostility is a factor to be considered in mitigation of the constructive ownership rules
in determining dividend equivalency on a redemption of corporate stock. At the Tax
Court level the court held that "the attribution rules of section 318, I.R.C. 1954, are
" Miller v. Commissioner, 75 T.C. 182, 190 (1980), Rickey v. United States, 592 F.2d 1251, 1254-55 (5th
Cir. 1979), Niedermeyer v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 280, 287, 291 (1974), Fehrs Finance Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 58 T.C. 174, 188, 190 and Lewis v. Commissioner, 35 T.C. 71, 77-78 (1960).
82 Cerone, 87 T.C. at 22.
'3 Haft, 510 F2d at 43 (1st Cir., 1975).
14 1d. at 45.
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 Id.
9OId.
91 Id.
92 Id.
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FAMILY ATTRIBUTION
applicable not withstanding the family fight." 93 This case and a supplemental
opinion were appealed. 91 The First Circuit then heard the case and held "that
existence of family hostility is a factor to be considered in mitigation of the
constructive ownership rules in determining dividend equivalency on a redemption
of corporate stock and that remand was required where the lower court made no
finding on the hostility question." 9 5 The Haft court interpreted the Davis interpre-
tation of meaningful reduction to permit and not "mandate, an examination of the
facts and circumstances to determine the effect of the transaction transcending a
mere mechanical application of the attribution rules." 96 The Haft court is not the first
to support the family hostility position.97
In Parker98 there was a redemption by a corporation of the father's stock giving
his son majority control. 99 Prior to the redemption there had been a long history of
substantive controversy about the running of the business.100 The Tax Court consid-
ered whether family hostility should be considered as a factor or whether Section
318(a)(1) is conclusive. The Parker court looked to the decision in Squier v.
Commissioner1'1 for assistance. 10 2 In Squier "The tax court embraced the principle
that family discord could belie the community- of- interest rationale of the attribution
rules and was a relevant circumstance in determining dividend equivalency under
(b)(1). 1 The Squier court recognized the" sharp cleavage" between the executor
and the members of the Squier family and held "taking the entire record into account
we are satisfied that even after applying the attribution rules here the redemptions in
controversy were not essentially equivalent to the distribution of a taxable divi-
dend. " 10 The Parker court after considering Squier concluded that the redemption
was not a dividend because "after taking the entire record into account, including the
relationships involved and the history of sharp and continuing disagreement between
Parker and Parker Jr. we conclude on the unusual facts presented that the redemption
brought about a significant change of control and we hold that the redemption here
at issue was not essentially equivalent to a dividend under section 302 (b)(1)."' 10 5
Several courts have spoken in favor of the partial waiver.'016 In Bradbury the court
said while "attribution rules are generally applicable to § 302(b)(1), . . . their
imposition is not inflexible and if it can be demonstrated that discord exists in a
13 Haft Trust v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 398, 398 (1973).
9' Supplemental opinion found at 62 T.C. 145 (1974).
9 Haft, 510 F.2d at 43-4.96 Id. at 48.
9 See Squier v. Commissioner, 35 T.C. 950 (1961), H.C. Parker 30 T.C.M., (P-H) 176 (1961).
98 30 T.C.M. (P-H) at 976.
99Id.
100id.
'01 35 T.C. 950 (1961).
02 Parker, 30 T.C.M. (P-H) at 983-4.
103 Haft, 510 F.2d at 46.
" Squier, 35 T.C. at 956.
'0' Parker, 30 T.C.M. (P-H) at 984.
"06 Bradbury v. Commissioner, 298 F.2d 111, 119 (1 st Cir. 1962), Deyoe v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 904,915
(1976) (Dicta).
1989]
9
Sunukjian: Family Attribution
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1989
AKRON TAX JOURNAL
family relationship which would make attribution unwarranted, they will not be
applied."' 7 In Deyoe,10 8 the court, in dicta, said that they were aware that family
hostilities have been taken into consideration in applying the attribution rules to
stock redemptions. 109
Why the difference in holdings between the First and Fifth Circuits? First, the
First Circuit draws much of its authority from Davis. It is agreed that Davis is a
Supreme Court holding of the role Code Section 318 plays in the scheme of Section
302. But, respecting the Metzger court's judgment, the Davis facts do not deal with
family hostility. Instead the issues were whether Section 318 applies to a Section 302
problem and whether a redemption of a business is essentially equivalent to a
dividend." 0 The hostility issue was not addressed and therefore, Davis may only be
referred to as dicta in resolving the hostility issue and not as authority.
Secondly, an additional problem with the Metzger decision is the court's
understanding of Section 318(a)(1) and whom is included as a family member. In
Metzger, the hostility was between a brother and his two sisters.' Code Section 318
(a)(l) includes the taxpayer's spouse, parents, children and grandchildren; siblings
are not included." 2 Therefore, under the facts of Metzger there is not a Section
318(a)(1) issue because under Section 318(a)(1) siblings are not considered as part
of the family for attribution purposes. In his dissent in Metzger, Judge Tannenwald
recognized these points and said, "we need not decide whether we may or should
ameliorate the application of Section 318 rules if justice would be served thereby and
I believe that a proper respect for the judicial function and its inherent limitations
required that we do not decide these questions before they are properly presented.'
PROPOSAL
The complexity and confusion of the family attribution rules can be lessened
merely by condensing similar terms and defining them by a general term. The
primary purpose is to give the taxpayer a centralized starting point so there is an
understanding of the concept before the taxpayer attempts to proceed through the
process. All of the possible relationships a taxpayer could have with a family
member can be restated in three groups. As previously stated, the first is vertical
attribution. This would include all the people before the taxpayer and those who
come after. Think of two rays, one going into the past and the other into the future
both with the common starting point being the taxpayer. Those included going back
from the taxpayer are parents, grandparents and great-grandparents. Those included
107 Bradbury, 298 F.2d at 111.
'0' 66 T.C. 904.
09 Id. at 915.
1o Davis, 397 U.S. at 301-02.
11 Metzger, 693 F.2d at 460-1.
112 I.R.C. § 318(a)(1) (1986). Appendix A.
"3 Metzger, 693 F.2d at 459 (Tannenwald, J., dissenting).
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coming from the taxpayer are children, grand-children and great-grandchildren.
Secondly, horizontal attribution includes individuals not on the taxpayer's
direct family line, but those who fall to one side or the other of the line. Included in
this group would be siblings and spouses of the taxpayer. Also included would be
spouses of lineal descendants.
The final type of attribution is quadralineal. This type employs both vertical
and horizontal attribution. It arises under the estate and gift tax code for the purposes
of the generation-skipping tax." 4 Quadralineal attribution works like this: B, de-
ceased, leaving no spouse nor issue, leaves property to parents, P. P waives. S, sister
predeceased B, but was survived by her daughter, N. N receives the property through
intestacy. Another example, same facts as above, but a sister D is alive and the
property passes to D, through intestacy. In both examples vertical and horizontal
attribution are used. The transfer from B to P is obviously vertical because P is on
the ray going back from B. The relation between B and D is horizontal because D
is not on either ray extending from B, but instead is to a side of it so horizontal
attribution is used. The same is true for D's daughter N. N, just like D is not on either
ray, but instead is to the side of it so here too horizontal attribution is used.
The terms, vertical, horizontal, and quadrilineal attribution, would be located
in Code Section 7701 in order for them to be applied as a uniform basis for attribution
rules to work from or completely incorporate; and also serve as a starting point of ref-
erence when someone comes across a family attribution problem. The most obvious
advantage of this simplified system is the taxpayer needs only to remember three
definitions instead of nine to work through the Code. Furthermore, if the taxpayer
cares not to memorize the three definitions they all can be found under the same code
section.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the family attribution rules can be simplified. The complexity
which exists can be significantly reduced merely by using clearly defined terms
which the taxpayer understands. Once this is accomplished there will be a simple
and clear understanding as to the purpose of attribution and partial waiver can be
allowed in cases where there is bad blood between related parties.
ALAN SUNUKJIAN
"' Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1 (1986).
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APPENDIX A
I.R.S. CODE SECTIONS
1
267(c)(4) 425(d)
503(b) 554(a)(2)
707(b)(3) 681(b)
1239(c)(2) 1237(a)(2)(A)
544(a)(2)
RELATIONSHIP
Brother & Sister
(inc. 1/2 blood)
Spouse
Spouse, if living
with Grantor
Spouse, if not
legally separated
Ancestors
Parents
Grandparents
Lineal Descendents
178
1. 178-2(B)
1234(d)
179(d)
341(e)(8)
[Vol. 6
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APPENDIX A - (Continued)
I.R.S. CODE SECTIONS
1 2
267(c)(4) 425(d) 178
503(b) 554(a)(2) 1.178-2(B)
707(b)(3) 681 (b) 1234(d)
1239(c)(2) 1237(a)(2)(A) 179(d)
544(a)(2) 341 (e)(8)
RELATIONSHIP
Spouse of Brother
or Sister
Children
Grandchildren
Great Grand-
children
Adopted Children
Brother & Sister
Minor Children
Spouses of
Children,
Grandchildren, and
Great Grand-
children
1989]
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I.R.S. CODE SECTIONS
4975 4946(a)(3)
4940(d)(3)(E)
4946(d)
1.341-4(b)(2) 1551(b)(2)(B)
1563(e)
RELATIONSHIP
Brother & Sister
(inc. 1/2 blood)
Spouse
Spouse, if living
with Grantor
Spouse, if not
legally separated
Ancestors
Parents
Grandparents
Lineal Descendents X
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APPENDIX A - (Continued)
I.R.S. CODE SECTIONS
4975 4946(a)(3)
4940(d)(3)(E)
4946(d)
1.341-4(b)(2) 1551 (b)(2)(B)
1563(e)
RELATIONSHIP
Spouse of Brother
or Sister
Children
Grandchildren
Great Grand-
children
Adopted Children
Brother & Sister
Minor Children
Spouses of
Children,
Grandchildren, and
Great Grand-
children
1989]
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I.R.S. CODE SECTIONS
9
341(d)672(c) 318(a)(1) 302(c)(1) 304(b)(1)
306(b)(1) 334(b)(3) 338(h)(1)
304(c)(1) 958(b)(3) 856(d)(5)
897(d)(6)(C) 382(1)(3)(A)(i)
416(i)(b)(iii)(II) 453(f)(1 )(A)
RELATIONSHIP
Brother & Sister
(inc. 1/2 blood)
Spouse
Spouse, if living
with Grantor
Spouse, if not
legally separated
Ancestors
Parents
Grandparents
Lineal Descendents
[Vol. 6
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APPENDIX A - (Continued)
I.R.S. CODE SECTIONS
7 8 9
672(c) 318(a)(1) 302(c)(1) 304(b)(1) 341(d)
306(b)(1) 334(b)(3) 338(h)(1)
304(c)(1) 958(b)(3) 856(d)(5)
897(d)(6)(C) 382(1)(3)(A)(i)
416(i)(b)(iii)(II) 453(f)(1)(A)
RELATIONSHIP
Spouse of Brother x
or Sister
Children x
Grandchildren x x
Great Grand- x
children
Adopted Children
Brother & Sister X
Minor Children X
Spouses of
Children,
Grandchildren, and
Great Grand-
children
1989]
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APPENDIX B
GROUP No. FROM APPENDIX A
1 2 3 4 5 9
RELATIONSHIP
Brother & x x
Sister
Spouse x x x x x x
Ancestor x x x x x x
Lineal x x x x x x
Descendents
Spouses of x x
Lineal
Descendents
Spouses of x x
Brothers &
Sisters
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